Challenges in managing technological disasters in Cameroon: Case study of Cameroon's worst train Crash—the Eséka train disaster. by Bang, Henry et al.
International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 44 (2020) 101410
Available online 26 November 20192212-4209/Crown Copyright © 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Challenges in managing technological disasters in Cameroon: Case study of 
Cameroon’s worst train Crash—the Es�eka train disaster 
Henry Ngenyam Bang *, Lee Stuart Miles, Richard Duncan Gordon 
Disaster Management Centre, Bournemouth University Dorset, Talbot Campus, Fern Barrow, BH12 5BB, Poole, UK   
1. Introduction 
Railway transport is increasing globally but despite the adoption of 
diverse safety systems, accidents and fatalities continue to rise in many 
countries. Indeed, railway disasters have increased in developing 
countries since 1980, while the reverse is true in Europe. Statistics show 
that from 1970 to 2009, 74% of railway disasters worldwide occurred in 
Africa, Asia, and South/Central America combined [1]. The trend also 
shows that since the mid-20th century, railway accidents worldwide 
have resulted in more people being non-fatally injured than fatally 
injured except in Africa where the relationship is almost equal [2]. 
The railway network of most African countries is a product of the 
colonial period, built cheaply (less than 4-inch gauge) inland from the 
ports and have not been upgraded for several decades [3,4]. Over the 
years, with insufficient investment and inadequate maintenance, the 
freight and passenger traffic has continued to increase, compromising 
safety with increased risk of accidents. In fact, increased traffic requires 
higher track expenditure maintenance because derailment risk de-
creases as the condition of the track improves [5]. 
A review of the causes of train accidents reveals that the main causes 
are infrastructure failures leading to derailment [5]; higher speeds and 
increased passenger traffic [2]; train driver distraction, inattention and 
non-compliance with train safety measures [6]. However, these attri-
butes are worst in developing countries partly due to poor crash miti-
gation and safety systems [2,6], and limited regulations or incomplete 
enforcement of existing rules [7]. 
Interestingly, research on technological hazards in many developing 
countries rarely focus on train accidents although it is responsible for 
one of the highest death rates in the transport sector. The few researches 
focus more on technology related train and railway safety, railway 
regulation and enforcement policies [2,6,7]. Moreover, whilst the pre-
vailing disaster management (DM) practices of most developing coun-
tries are more reactive than proactive, managing response and recovery 
is ineffective [8]. Post-disaster management has not been given 
adequate research attention albeit the importance of proper crisis 
management in saving lives and livelihoods [9,10]. This article con-
tributes in this direction, by examining the response and recovery to the 
worst train disaster ever to happen in Cameroon—the Es�eka Train 
Disaster (ETD) that occurred on October 21, 2016. 
We subscribe to the premise that technological hazards are caused by 
failures in the human system and their effects/impacts can be reduced 
through effective DM [11]. Hence, the aim of this article is to understand 
the management of technological disasters in Cameroon. To achieve the 
aim, two main objectives were identified: (1) to critically assess the 
response and recovery following the ETD that occurred in Cameroon and 
(2) Based on the findings, to identify lessons that can be learned from the 
management of the response and recovery, and provide recommenda-
tions for improvement. 
The next section succinctly provides a background to train accidents 
in Cameroon. Section two is a brief review of technological hazards in 
Cameroon followed by the conceptual framework adopted by this 
research in section three. The methodology is discussed in section four 
while section five presents the events leading to the ETD. The research 
findings are presented and analysed in section six followed by a dis-
cussion section. The conclusion and recommendations is in section 
eight. 
2. Brief review of technological hazards in Cameroon 
Cameroon is prone to technological and natural hazard-induced di-
sasters [8]. The Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) of the Centre for 
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) reveals that from 
1988 to 2018 41 technological disasters occurred in Cameroon causing 
1542 deaths, 1272 injuries and affected 3061 people (see Table 1). 
Analysis from the database shows that of all transportation accidents, 
rail accidents cause the highest number of injuries (1050) and is second 
to fire hazards for the total number of people affected in all technolog-
ical disasters in the country. 
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Actually, a closer examination of technological hazards in Cameroon 
reveals the statistics held on the CRED/EM-DAT is inaccurate—more 
train accidents with potential dire long-term consequences for the sur-
vivors have occurred. Although an analysis of the EM-DAT/CRED 
database shows that 41 technological hazards from 1988 to 2018 
caused 1542 deaths, 1272 injuries and affected 3061 people (see 
Table 1), the statistics is inaccurate. The database reports only three 
train accidents between 1988 and 2017. However, in 1998, there were 
271 derailments with 37 occurring on the main Yaound�e-Douala line 
resulting to several hundred deaths. Notable, was the Nsam train crash 
in Yaound�e involving two petroleum tankers that killed around 120 
people [3]. In 2009, train crashes caused 5 deaths and 300 injured [1]. 
After the ETD, from October 21, 2016 to December 8, 2017 four train 
accidents occurred in Cameroon—Ndokoti (Douala) on November 26, 
2016; Elig-Edzoa (Yaound�e) on March 8, 2017; near Makondo, about 87 
miles west of Yaound�e on July 26, 2017 and near Maboni Village (South 
West Region) on December 8, 2017. 
The continuous growth of Cameroon’s population (23.5 million as of 
2016) and business transactions are increasing passenger and freight rail 
transport [3] (see Fig. 1). About 1.6 million passengers and 1.8 million 
tonnes of freight use the service annually [12] putting great pressure on 
the network, leading to an increase in railway accidents. The frequent 
train accidents pose a grave threat to Cameroon’s transportation sector 
although the country has a sparse rail network—single railway track of 
1104 km with 976 km operational and conceded to a single private 
operator: CAMRAIL [4] (see Fig. 2). 
Cameroon has a 20-year concessioned (extended to 30 years in 2005) 
railway business model signed in 1999 by the government of Cameroon 
and CAMRAIL that involves the operation and management of rolling 
stock, rolling stock investment and operation and management of 
infrastructure. The Cameroon government owns 13.5% of the shares in 
CAMRAIL and has responsibility to finance the railway track rehabili-
tation while the Concessionaire, the Bollor�e Group that owns the bulk of 
the shares (77.4%) was kept in charge of the operations and rolling stock 
financing, including maintenance of passenger carriages [4]. 
3. Conceptual framework 
This article embraces a conceptual framework technique to provide 
focus and structure to this qualitative study [13]. The conceptual un-
derpinning includes both pro-active and reactive strategies to DM called 
an integrated disaster management approach (IDMA) [14]. The IDMA 
has been conceptualised into the traditional DM process that consists of 
four complementary phases—mitigation and preparedness (pro-active 
or risk-reduction phase) and response and recovery (reactive or 
post-disaster phase) commonly known as the DM cycle (see Fig. 2). 
The adapted framework in Fig. 2 shows key activities for effective 
DM at the different phases obtained from in-dept review of organisa-
tional DM manuals and training documents; government DM policies, 
frameworks, plans and programmes and academic/research articles, 
including books on DM [11,14–25]. Furthermore, the framework blends 
contemporary strategies, techniques and good DM practices in DM such 
as multilevel, multi-dimensional and multidisciplinary cooperation and 
collaboration; enhancing coordination and integration of stakeholders’ 
action through good communication and efficient exchange of relevant 
and reliable information; ensuring that appropriate enabling policy, 
capacity building and resource mechanisms are in place; implementing 
the DRM process from the national level to the community level and 
achieving effective disaster reduction and response through decisions 
based on reliable disaster risk information [26]. 
Although the conceptual framework shows the standard DM model 
with four phases, this research focuses on the response and recovery 
phases of the ETD. However, operationally, all the phases complement 
each other. Detailed analysis of all the phases, inclusive of risk reduction 
(mitigation and preparedness) is beyond the analysis of this article, 
albeit it informs the causes of the ETD (see Section 7). 
Response is conceptualised in this article as the provision of emer-
gency services and public assistance during or immediately after a 
disaster in order to save lives, reduces health impacts, ensure public 
safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected. Re-
covery is the restoration and improvement where appropriate, of facil-
ities, livelihoods and living conditions of disaster-affected communities, 
including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors [27]. 
4. Methodology 
This is a case study research that adopts an empirical qualitative and 
descriptive approach employing strategies such as thematic and 
Table 1 
Technological disasters in Cameroon from 1988 to 2017.  
Year Disaster 
type 
Occurrence Total 
deaths 
Injured Totala 
affected 
1988 Other 1 60 ND ND 
1989–1994 ND 
1995 Air 1 74 4 4 
1995 Water 2 300 DNA ND 
1996–1997  
1998 Rail 1 120 150 150 
1999 Road 1 29 ND ND 
2000 Road 3 51 70 70 
2001–2002 ND 
2003 Road 4 119 44 44 
2004 DNA 
2005 Road 2 24 12 12 
2005 Water 1 30 ND ND 
2006 Road 3 55 12 12 
2006 Water 1 127 ND ND 
2007 Air 1 114 ND ND 
2007 Road 2 37 27 27 
2007 Water 2 32 ND 28 
2008 Road 2 27 16 16 
2008 Water 1 40 ND 6 
2009 Rail 1 5 300 300 
2009 Water 2 31 ND 5 
2010 Fire 1 ND 5 1755 
2010 Road 2 40 ND ND 
2010 Water 1 24 ND ND 
2011 Road 3 74 30 30 
2012–2015 ND 
2016 Rail 1 75 600 600 
2017 Road 1 20 2 2 
2017 Water 1 34 ND ND 
Total 41 1542 1272 3061  
a Total affected include the injured, without fatalities, including other aspects 
such as income loss, displacement and other illnesses directly or indirectly 
related to the incident such as stress exetera. ND¼No data. 
Source: Adapted from Ref. [1]. 
Fig. 1. Railway traffic in Cameroon from 1991 to 2011. Source: [3].  
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narrative analysis. This approach is central to understanding institu-
tional practices and the behaviour of disaster authorities and offers 
flexibility to the researcher to gain better insight into the phenomenon 
under study, and a greater ability to give an in-dept analysis [28]. 
Indeed, case studies help to bring an understanding of complex issues 
that adds strength to the understanding of a social phenomenon [29]. 
The article was inspired by another research. While the corre-
sponding author was conducting interviews for another related research 
on disaster risk reduction in Cameroon in 2017, the respondents, mainly 
mid-top level DM stakeholders repeatedly used the ETD (which occurred 
a few months earlier) as evidence to elucidate their responses on resil-
ience to technological disasters in the country. Due to the rich data being 
obtained on the ETD, the researcher reviewed the research strategy and 
decided to probe further into the ETD. 
Technical reports, official documents and interviews comprised 
sources of primary data. At the time of the research, the ETD was just 
6–7 months old so very few documents/reports were available on the 
incident. However, there were incomplete reports that the research 
could not obtain because such were considered sensitive and required 
authorisation from senior management. The researcher was told to be 
patient and have access to them when they are officially released. 
Indeed, several months/years after the incident, the government has 
granted access—via government websites, to selected reports/docu-
ments on the ETD. Technical reports and official documents were ob-
tained from diverse sources—for example [4,30–38]. 
Semi-structured interviews (face-to-face and telephone) were done 
between March and April of 2017 concerning the management of the 
ETD—the case study of this research. Initially a purposeful sampling 
technique was used to identify six, eight and nine DM practitioners who 
were involved in the tactical, strategic and operational management of 
the ETD respectively from different government agencies/ministries. Of 
the six managers with tactical functions contacted at the national level, 
four were involved in the ongoing investigation into the ETD and 
preferred not to comment. One recommended a colleague who accepted 
(including the two initially contacted) to be interviewed under condi-
tions of anonymity. Four respondents from the emergency services with 
strategic DM responsibilities at the regional level were interviewed 
through a snowballing technique, suggested by their peers who were 
unavailable for interviews due to other commitments. Since the re-
searcher’s time in the Cameroons was limited, a local research assistant 
interviewed 5 of the 9 personnel involved in the operational response to 
the ETD. Therefore, a total of twelve interviews were conducted—three, 
four and five at the national, regional and local levels, respectively. The 
interview process was guided by ethical principles and the opportunity 
of gaining access to people who can supply rich information [39,40]. 
Respondents provided in-dept information on a broad range of issues 
based on question themes that focused on activities relating to their 
specific roles, responsibilities and experiences during the response and 
recovery of the ETD including how they perceive the overall manage-
ment of the incident. 
To enhance the validity of the research, empirical data was trian-
gulated with information sources obtained from reports, policy/tech-
nical documents held by the government, private, corporate and 
International agencies and organisations, academic journals and news-
paper articles. In fact, the latter constitute a vital source of information 
as all aspects of the incident management is in the public interest and 
has been covered extensive by both the government and private press. 
Considering our professional and operational activities that revolve 
daily around academic and practical aspects of DM, we are conscious to 
be reflective on our personal position within and relative to this study to 
minimise any prejudices, assumptions and bias in the data collection and 
analysis [41]. The adapted IDMA (see Section 2) guided the thematic 
data analysis. 
Ethical considerations underpin empirical data collection in this 
research with informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality adopted 
as key principles. Participation was on a voluntary basis with verbal 
consent obtained from the respondents after details of the research 
(purpose, process, participants choice/voluntary participation, outcome 
etc) had been explained. Potential disaster management stakeholders 
initially contacted who were sceptical to participate were not coerced. 
The anonymity and confidentiality of those who consented to participate 
was guaranteed. Digitally recorded interviews were done only with the 
permission of respondents, and there was mutual agreement with some 
that recorded interviews be removed once the data had been transcribed 
and analysed [28,42]. 
5. The Es�eka train accident 
On October 21, 2016, an inter-city train (No. 152) travelling from 
Cameroon’s capital city (Yaound�e) to the economic capital (Douala) had 
Fig. 2. The DM Cycle showing key activities in the management of disasters, Source: Authors.  
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a fatal accident at about 12.30 p.m. in Es�eka about 75 miles from 
Yaound�e (see Fig. 3). When the accident happened, the train had 17 
carriages and about 1300 passengers on board. 
The train derailed at a bend causing four carriages to overturn (see 
Fig. 4). At the time of the accident, the train was overloaded with 700 
more passengers than its normal capacity of 600. More than 200 people 
died and about 1000 were injured [43] although the official government 
report said 81 dead and 801 injured [44,45]. 
The Presidency set up a commission of enquiry (COE) into the ETD 
on October 25, 2016 under the auspices of the Prime Minister (PM). The 
COE was assigned the following tasks; determine the causes of the ac-
cident; determine who is to be blamed for the accident; assess the 
disaster response in terms of how the incident was managed, including 
assistance to the victims and to propose any helpful recommendations 
and propose measures aimed at reducing risks of similar disasters in the 
future [33,34]. 
The finding of the COE was released seven months later—May 23, 
2017. The report stated that CAMRAIL had “total and entire responsibility” 
for the crash and was mainly to blame for the accident. It mentioned five 
main reasons for the ETD: (i) CAMRAIL’s non-observance of safety rules 
as the main cause of the accident; (ii) over speeding—the train was 
travelling at 96 km/h (60 mph) on a rail section that has a lower speed 
limit of 40 km/h (25 mph) and in an area with steep slopes and several 
sharp bends; (iii) Overloading—the train was carrying 1300 passengers 
rather than its normal capacity of 600; (iv) defective braking sys-
tem—13 of the 17 carriages on the train had malfunctioning braking 
systems; (v) there was no proper pre-departure inspection of the rake’s 
braking system in Yaound�e and (vi) CAMRAIL’s administrators ignored 
warnings expressed by the train driver on points (v). In addition, the 
enquiry report mentioned that the response of the emergency services 
was inadequate and/or poor. 
A key recommendation of the COE was that “… the capacity of Gov-
ernment services to conduct rescue operations during disasters must be 
enhanced for greater responsiveness, coherence and fluidity and for better 
victim management”. In response to the COE’s report, the government 
ordered the enhancement of the national major disaster and risk pre-
vention and management system through (i) mainstreaming of terrorist 
act occurrences, (ii) better ownership by stakeholders of their respective 
roles and the chain of command, and (iii) regular conduct of full-scale 
drills [34]. 
5.1. Events leading up to the accident 
Prior to the train accident, heavy rainfall and landslides on the early 
hours of Friday, October 21, 2016 had caused a bridge to collapse over 
the Doupe River (see Fig. 5) at Manyai, 43 miles from Yaound�e, along 
the busy Yaound�e-Douala highway, which has the heaviest traffic in the 
country. The bridge collapsed and cut movements between the two cities 
leading to a considerably high passenger built. The stranded passengers 
sort alternative ways of transportation and decided to use the next easily 
available and affordable means that is by rail. Consequently, the number 
of passengers travelling by rail increased tremendously. In response, the 
management of the rail network, CAMRAIL (also known as Cameroon 
Railways) added more carriages to the Yaound�e-Douala intercity trains. 
Fig. 3. Location of Es�eka along Cameroon’s rail network. Source: Adapted from Ref. [12].  
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6. Research findings 
This section analyses the management of the ETD with focus on the 
response and recovery. In fact, one of the tasks assigned to the COE 
following the accident was to assess the disaster response in terms of 
how the incident was managed, including assistance to the victims. 
6.1. Response to the ETD 
6.1.1. Crisis response coordination 
The management of the immediate aftermath of the ETD left much to 
be desired. The ETD occurred when Cameroon’s President had been 
abroad for three weeks. All respondents (N ¼ 12) believe the president 
succumbed to pressure from the Cameroonian diaspora and returned 
home on October 23, two days after the disaster. He sent condolence 
messages to the bereaved families via his Facebook account, and 
announced a government led COE to determine the cause of the disaster. 
However, respondents thought he should have done more. According to 
a senior administrator “ …...upon his return, he did not bother to visit the 
disaster site or see the victims and evaluate what had happened considering 
this was the worst train accident in the country”. 
All the respondents at the regional and local levels (N ¼ 9) informed 
the research that the first opportunity to tell the nation about govern-
ments’ immediate actions to resolve the crisis was missed when the PM 
visited Es�eka the day after the accident but refused a request from the 
traditional leaders of the region to brief them and the press on govern-
ment’s actions [47]. 
Furthermore, an inter-ministerial delegation led by the Ministers of 
Transport and Public Health visited the accident site shortly after the 
disaster. While respondents at the national level (N ¼ 3) said this was 
appropriate action to apprise the situation, they were critical of the 
ministers making unilateral decisions to rush to the scene without 
consulting with stakeholder ministries and the Directorate of Civil 
Protection (DCP)—the nodal agency responsible for coordinating DM 
activities in Cameroon. The Minister of public health announced that his 
ministry would oversee managing the accident scene [30]. However, all 
the interviewees (N ¼ 12) intimated minimal cooperation and coordi-
nation on the scene with different ministries/agencies adhering to their 
chain of command rather than adopting a coordinated approach. 
For example, the research was informed that the Ministry of Terri-
torial Administration and Decentralisation (MTAD) set up two crisis 
committees; one in Es�eka under the auspices of the Senior Divisional 
Officer (SDO) of Es�eka and the other in Douala, the train’s destination. 
The committees handled managing information at the scene of the ac-
cident and to ensure the safe transfer of the ETD survivors to Douala. The 
committee in Es�eka ran an ad-hoc Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) 
that supplied a toll-free number for those affected to enquire about 
relative involved in the disaster. On the other hand, CAMRAIL also set 
up a crisis centre at the Yaound�e and Douala railway stations and issued 
a hotline number (699 10 18 10) for enquiries [36]. 
All the Respondents (N ¼ 12) confirmed the rescue operation were 
plagued with numerous problems. 3 out of the 4 respondents at the 
regional level and all local respondents informed the research that co-
ordination of both EOCs had issues because their information was not 
synchronised. They were also concerned that call operators were few 
and spoke French only. This posed problems to the English-speaking 
Cameroonians who found it difficult to communicate with the opera-
tors. The importance of cooperation, coordination and control for 
effective crises management cannot be over-emphasised [10,27] (see 
Fig. 2). 
6.1.2. Search and rescue (SR) 
The rescue operation was very slow and chaotic. All responders 
acknowledged the vital role played by the local population (first re-
sponders) to save lives in the immediate aftermath of the accident. They 
said prior to the arrival of emergency services on the scene, local people 
had rescued most of survivors (see Fig. 6). This response is corroborated 
with newspaper reports. For example, a 32-year-old local man, Franklin, 
rescued injured people and removed about 50 dead bodies from the 
wreckage [43]. In addition, the regional and local interviewees (N ¼ 9) 
acknowledged that the Es�eka residents who arrived the scene first pro-
vided local first aid and traditional treatment to the wounded while 
waiting for the emergency services. This was confirmed by press reports 
[49]. 
According to local respondents, the Cameroon Red Cross (CRC) was 
one of the first NGOs to arrive the scene. The CRC deployed 66 emer-
gency responders who provided first aid to 561 injured passengers 
within 48 h and retrieve 55 dead bodies from the wreckage [36]. 
The first government emergency services reached the scene late in 
the evening and according to the local respondents (N ¼ 5), several dead 
bodies and injured passengers had been trapped in the wreckage for 
several hours before they arrived. Indeed, injured passengers were 
trapped in the wreckage in some cases for up to 24 h without help before 
some died [49]. This is partly because the first rescuers did not have the 
Fig. 4. Derailed trains during the Es�eka train accident. Source: Various courtesy of [46,47].  
Fig. 5. (i) Collapse bridge at Manyai (ii) Stranded passengers at collapse bridge (iii) Quick fix of collapsed bridge using a container (iv) Queue of vehicles waiting for 
the bridge to be fixed. Source: Various- [47,48]. 
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appropriate equipment to remove trapped people/bodies from the 
wreckage [36]. The emergency and security services deployed to the 
scene were the National Fire Service (NFS), Police, Gendarmes, a med-
ical team, CAMRAIL’s security and the Army Engineers who played a 
vital role in the rescue operation. 
Findings also uncovered delays in the rescue operation. Removal of 
the damaged/derailed carriages only started on October 22nd—more 
than 24 hrs later. Respondents (N ¼ 10) affirmed the Army Engineering 
Corps used cranes to remove the damaged carriages in an operation that 
lasted three days. Indeed, 14 people were still trapped in the wreckage 
on the night of the day the accident occurred and on October 22, 23, and 
24; 15, 7 and 12 bodies respectively were recovered from the wreckage 
of the damaged carriages [51]. All respondents (N ¼ 12) were unani-
mous that the slow recovery pace compromised the survival of some 
trapped victims. In an interview granted to the French newspaper —Le 
Monde Afrique News after the ETD, the supervisor of the recovery 
operation said although the priority was to extract the bodies trapped, 
the challenge was to get to them without damaging the carriages [43]. 
When the research recounted this statement to the respondents, 1 out of 
the 3 respondents with tactical functions and all the regional and local 
respondents (N ¼ 9) interpreted it as implying the military rescue team 
was trying to minimise damage to the train rather than expediting the 
removal of potential survivors, hence the slow pace of the rescue/r-
ecovery operation. 
6.1.3. Medical assistance and mass casualty handling 
Research findings reveal several difficulties in the provision of 
medical assistance. Es�eka is small town in the Nyong-et-Kelle Division of 
the Central Region (Fig. 3) and has a district hospital that lacks sufficient 
medical facilities. Hundreds of survivors and dead people were taken to 
the Es�eka District Hospital but the hospital was quickly overwhelmed 
because it lacked a blood bank, had limited anti-tetanus serum, had only 
60 beds for patients, mortuary space for only 15 bodies and quickly ran 
out of medication to treat the sick. Furthermore, the poor state of the 
road hampered efforts to transport medical materials to the hospi-
tal—92% of respondents (N ¼ 11) [30, 43]. The Ministry of Health 
supplemented the medical equipment of the Es�eka hospital to facilitate 
treatment of the victims [31]. While this action is applauded, the gov-
ernment should always ensure hospitals are well-equipped to handle 
emergencies. 
Due to lack of space at the Es�eka District Hospital, most of the injured 
and dead were transported to other hospitals in the Central and Littoral 
Regions. Triage of the injured took place in a temporary health facility 
created at the Yaound�e train station [30] although this should happen at 
the scene of the accident. The deceased/injured transported to Yaound�e 
were taken several health facilities—Yaound�e Emergency Centre, Cen-
tral Hospital, University Teaching Hospital, Police Medical Centre and 
Military hospital. Those taken to Douala were accommodated at health 
facilities there including the Pouma, Laquintinie, General, 
Gyno-obstetrics and Military hospitals, including the Muna and IDIMED 
Clinics [30,31,51]. Some hospitals ran out of shortage of blood to treat 
the injured. Indeed, the Cameroon National Order of Physicians said the 
emergency required at least 20,000 sachets of blood [36]. To this effect, 
the Ministry of Health appealed to the public to donate blood [52]. The 
president promised that the state would take care of all the medical bills 
[33]. 
6.1.4. Evacuation of the injured and the dead 
The evacuation of the injured passengers from Es�eka was not a fast 
and smooth process. According to the regional and local interviewees 
(N ¼ 9), bad roads compounded the evacuation effort. Indeed, the 
wreckage had to be removed from the rail track before trains could 
evacuate the victims to other hospitals. Local respondents (N ¼ 5) 
mentioned that many wounded survivals were dispatched to hospitals in 
Douala and Yaound�e two days after the ETD, many in critical condition. 
For instance, between 60-70 dead bodies and 50 injured people, some 
unconscious, arrived the train station in Yaound�e two days after the 
accident. In fact, the Governor of the Littoral Region confirmed that 
more than 200 victims were sent to Douala and some died upon arrival 
at the hospitals there [50]. These accounts indicate that many lives were 
lost due to delays in evacuating the injured. 
6.1.5. Casualty tracking and disaster victim identification (DVI) 
DVI is major limitation in the response to the ETD. Research evidence 
(from 8 out of the 9 regional/local respondents) suggests the emergency 
services did not implement formal procedures to recover, identify and 
track the deceased and human remains sent to hospitals in the region. 
Consequently, people flooded hospitals in Yaound�e and Douala in a 
blind search for their relatives who boarded the train. For example, a 
man (Mustapha Abbo) lost the sister in the accident but could not trace 
the corpse [49]. Similarly, a 42-year old man found the dead body of his 
sister’s son in Yaound�e after searching in vain in Douala [49]. There was 
no DVI service to provide accurate information about the whereabouts 
of the injured and dead. 
The Ministry of Health sent out a press release stating that 68 bodies 
were taken to mortuaries in Yaound�e hospitals. The public were to fulfil 
the following conditions before collecting dead relatives: at least three 
relatives were to confirm/identify the dead, provide their Identity cards, 
and proof of family relation— birth/marriage certificates [32]. 
Furthermore, interview data from all national and regional in-
terviewees (N ¼ 7) suggests some passengers could not be found/traced 
more than one year after the ETD. For example, a prominent Cameroon 
Lawyer (Barrister Dorette Dissak�e), who sat on seat number 54C in 
carriage No 152 has not been found (dead or alive) more than one year 
after the incident [53]. The husband told the press that: “My wife was in 
this train; she was sitting in first class. When the train derailed, some people in 
his carriage survived. But she is totally missing … If she is dead, where is her 
body?” [54]. In addition, Mr Lesieur David Mekem has also been 
searching for his son (Romial Tedonzong) since October 21, 2016 [55]. 
The government also confirmed missing victims from the ETD (see 
Section 6.2.1). 
Since all the local responders (N ¼ 5) confirmed that body parts were 
found at the scene of the accident-see also [36, 43], these might have 
belonged to some missing passengers. All respondents were unsure 
whether appropriate techniques were used to identify the body parts. 
Forensic techniques would certainly link dead victims, including body 
parts, with their relatives. 
Interestingly, the findings of the COE to identify the cause of the ETD 
Fig. 6. (ii) First responders (public) rescuing trapped passengers (iii) Woman desperately tries to get out of derailed train (iv) rescued injured passengers sit helpless 
on the ground. Source: Various courtesy of Reuters, AFP/GETTY images. 
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and that to compensate the victims did not mention the exact number of 
passengers in the train at the time of the accident [44]. Moreover, 
Governments’ reaction to the COE’s report did not mention whether the 
search for the missing passengers will continue or actions will be taken 
to identify/trace their dead bodies. Research attempts to find out if the 
train had a passenger manifest proved to be futile. 100% of the re-
spondents (N ¼ 12) alleged it was a common practice to issue train 
tickets without documenting the names of the passengers. Without a 
clear idea of the number and names of passengers who boarded the train 
that faithful day we may never know the exact number and nationalities 
of fatalities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, said a French 
national was killed and another one wounded [50]. 
6.2. Recovery 
6.2.1. Compensation for victims 
After the ETD, both CAMRAIL and the Government promised to 
provide financial assistance to the victims and/or their beneficiaries. 
CAMRAIL promised to compensate each family’s victim with 1 million 
FCFA (Franc de la Communaut�e Financi�ere d’Afrique) equivalent to � US$ 
1779. However, several families have not been paid. Interviews and 
press reports reveal that CAMRAIL was using unethical ways to 
manoeuvre the victims to either not compensate them or provide dis-
counted compensation packages far lower than promised. According to 
75% (N ¼ 9) of the respondents and [56], many victims who have been 
compensated were offered reduced amounts, which they accepted 
because of poverty. For instance, one victim requested 51 million FCFA 
(�US$ 91, 445) but was paid only 4 million FCFA(�US$ 7172); another 
victim fractured his right hand, was operated at his testicles, constantly 
bled from his nose and had problems with his nerves but was awarded 
just 5% of what he requested, which he refused [43]. It was alleged that 
CAMRAIL was encouraging victims not to use lawyers, claiming they 
were blocking the compensation process [57]. Around 83% (N ¼ 10) of 
the interviewees were keen to point out that without adequate 
compensation, disaster victims in poor countries like Cameroon are left 
with undesirable long-term consequences for the rest of their lives. 
The government also pledged one billion FCFA (�US$ 1.8 billion) as 
supplementary assistance to the victims and their rightful claimants 
[33]. To this effect, the PM set up a compensation commission that 
published a list of potential 888 beneficiaries on October 21, 2017. 
Analysis of the list reveals that 801 survivors sustained body injuries and 
can prove temporary disability of at least one day, 81 people died (4 
corpses unidentified) and 7 people were missing [44]. Details of how the 
compensation will be shared is not known but our calculation indicates 
that if all survivors and families of the dead/missing were to be 
compensated equally, each will receive 112,486 FCFA (�US$ 197.5), a 
small amount indeed. 
6.2.2. Blame avoidance 
Findings reveal CAMRAIL and the government tried desperately to 
divert culpability for the ETD. When the accident happened, the Board 
Chair of CAMRAIL released a public statement denying the company 
was responsible for it. It was also alleged that a CAMRAIL worker 
attempted to steal the train event recorder and falsify the data relating to 
the number of wagons, tonnage and stop brake weight, which can reveal 
the true condition of the train prior to the accident. Purportedly, also, a 
CAMRAIL technician who was in the train at the time of the accident has 
received threats to stop him from revealing the real cause of the accident 
[58]. 
Furthermore, research evidence suggests that the Minister of Trans-
port instructed CAMRAIL officials to add more carriages to the trains in 
order to accommodate passengers that flooded the Yaound�e train station 
following the collapse of the bride at Manyi [59]. Not surprisingly, the 
Minister denied the allegations during an interview with Canal 2 TV 
stating that CAMRAIL unilaterally took the decision to add the carriages 
[60]. He publicly blamed the train driver for the accident. The train 
driver only availed himself after revealing that he raised safety concerns 
about the train before departing from Yaound�e but was ignored by his 
manager [34]. Attempts to avoid and shift blame onto others is a com-
mon characteristic of Cameroon’s DM [61]. 
Although all national level respondents and 78% (N ¼ 7) of the 
regional/local respondents acknowledged that CAMRAIL’s shares blame 
for the accident for adding defective carriages, around 34% of the in-
terviewees (N ¼ 4–2 national and regional), questioned the fairness of 
the enquiry that indicted CAMRAIL alone considering the government 
has stakes in the company [3,4]. We would argue that the blame 
avoidance is due to incompetency and policy failure rather than in-
capacity [61]. 
6.2.3. Implications for CAMRAIL 
The government reacted to the findings of the ETD enquiry by out-
lining the following actions: to review the concession agreement with 
CAMRAIL that authorised the corporation’s operations in Cameroon; to 
initiate a dialogue with CAMRAIL about a greater state involvement in 
the corporation especially on social issues, notably passenger transport; 
to set up a temporary company responsible for maintaining and mod-
ernising the railway network [34]. Whether these actions will actually 
happen is still to be seen. 
In addition, all respondents (N ¼ 12) were aware that the govern-
ment, disaster survivors and their relatives have sued CAMRAIL—the 
government filed a lawsuit against CAMRAIL in the court of first 
instance in Douala on September 28, 2017. CAMRAIL has also been sued 
in France by the families of two French citizens involved in the accident. 
The multiple charges levied against CAMRAIL range from manslaughter, 
dangerous activities, recklessness, negligence and missing person [43, 
62,63]. CAMRAIL disputes some of the charges, citing, for example, 
design flaws in new trains purchased from China in 2014—an allegation 
the manufacturer refused [64]. Suing CAMRAIL sends a strong signal 
that companies must take full responsibility for their activities. 
Furthermore, the ETD has resulted to administrative changes in 
CAMRAIL. The General Manager of the Company was sacked and 
replaced on June 9, 2017. The Chair of the board of directors was also 
replaced with a senior civil servant from the PM’s office [59,65]. All the 
interviewed senior civil servants at the national level (N ¼ 3) believe the 
appointment of the Chairman of the Board of Directors is a government 
strategy to have a greater representation and influence in CAMRAIL’s 
management. 
Table two highlights the key response and recovery activities from 
the research findings, problems identified, or lessons learned and key 
recommendations. 
7. Discussion 
Apart from commercial aviation, railways are the most safe and 
sustainable form of transport [66]. However, this is not the case in many 
developing countries like Cameroon where railway transportation is 
preferred due to its low cost. As the ETD has shown, train crashes, 
although less frequent than automobile accidents, are macabre, often 
fatal, and more likely to cause fatalities or serious health problems on 
victims such as amputations or paralysis [67,68]. 
The findings of the COE mentioned operational and safety issues that 
caused the ETD and blamed CAMRAIL solely for the incident. The 
report, which undermined government’s role in the incident, is biased 
albeit not surprising since the COE was set up by the government. From 
the COE’s report, one can establish a link between infrastructure, op-
erations, maintenance and safety. Since the government has stakes in 
CAMRAIL with the responsibility to finance the railway track rehabili-
tation [4], an independent COE should have been set up so that all the 
stakeholders involved are treated fairly, lawfully, and the time-
line/budget for the enquiry is maintained. An independent COE is ideal 
to engage in a worthwhile fact-finding exercise of polity formulation and 
structural reform in Cameroon’s railway industry. The trigger for an 
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Table 2 
Activities, problems identified and lessons learned/recommendations from 
managing the response and recovery of the ETD.  
Response and 
Recovery Activities 
Lessons Learned/Problems 
Identified 
Recommendations 
Crisis Response 
Coordination  
� The legal authority of the 
DCP to coordinate 
incidents/disasters in 
Cameroon was not 
respected.  
� DM stakeholders should 
be educated to recognise 
and respect the DCP as 
the central agency 
responsible for 
coordinating incidents/ 
disasters.  
� Government ministers 
unilaterally visited the 
crisis scene without a 
central coordination.  
� Allied DM ministries/ 
agencies should first 
liaise with the DCP after 
incidents/disasters prior 
to visiting disaster scenes.  
� There was chaos at the 
accident scene without a 
clear idea of the agency 
leading the operations.  
� The government should 
establish a clear incident 
command structure for 
major incidents and 
educate the security 
services.  
� There was duplication of 
functions by emergency 
services at the accident 
scene.  
� The main emergency 
services should be trained 
on their specific 
responsibilities in a 
unified incident response.  
� CAMRAIL and the 
government were 
running different ad-hoc 
uncoordinated EOCs.  
� A national EOC should be 
established under the 
DCP with authority to 
manage information 
during crisis situations.  
� The ad-hoc EOCs has few 
operatives that were not 
bilingual.  
� Enough trained and 
bilingual operatives 
should be recruited to 
work in EOCs that are 
well equipped.  
� Operational inter-agency 
coordination and cooper-
ation was poor.  
� Regular incident 
management drills 
involving the emergency 
services should be 
conducted. 
Search and Rescue 
(SR)  
� First responders were 
members of the local 
community with no first 
aid skills.  
� Local communities along 
the railway lines should 
be provided with basic 
first aid and search and 
rescue training.  
� The emergency services 
reached the accident 
scene several hours after 
the incident.  
� The emergency services 
should have unlimited 
access to logistics that can 
enable swift deployment 
to incident sites.  
� The operation to remove 
the wreckage, trapped 
victims and fatalities was 
slow, probably because 
rescuers were cautious 
not to seriously damage 
the wreckage.  
� Major rescue operations 
should focus on saving 
lives rather than prevent 
damage to property in the 
process. Property can be 
replaced but lives lost 
cannot be replaced. 
Medical Assistance 
and Mass Casualty 
Handling  
� The Es�eka District 
Hospital lacked basic and 
enough first aid kits to 
treat the wounded.  
� All hospitals should have 
abundant reserves of 
basic first aid kits for 
emergency treatment.  
� Medical staff deployed 
from Yaound�e to the 
accident scene lacked the 
necessary equipment and 
medicine to treat the 
injured.  
� The government should 
review its contingency 
plans for health 
emergency assistance 
with the provision of 
appropriate resources 
and training of personnel.  
� Triage of injured 
passengers was done 
upon arrival in Yaound�e.  
� Triage of injured 
passengers should be 
done at the accident 
scene to prioritise victims 
in need of urgent 
treatment.  
Table 2 (continued ) 
Response and 
Recovery Activities 
Lessons Learned/Problems 
Identified 
Recommendations 
Evacuation of the 
injured and dead  
� Poor road conditions 
delayed transportation of 
the injured to other 
hospitals.  
� Where accessibility is a 
problem, helicopters 
should be used to 
transport injured 
passengers swiftly to 
hospitals. 
Casualty Tracking 
and Disaster 
Victim (DVI) 
Identification  
� Casualty tracking of the 
injured/dead was 
extremely poor resulting 
to a blind search for 
victims.  
� The government should 
put in place clear 
procedures/guidelines 
for victim identification 
and tracing the injured/ 
dead during disasters.  
� Poor information 
dissemination/ 
communication with the 
public about disaster 
victims.  
� Clear information and 
communication channels 
should be established to 
inform the public about 
disaster victims.  
� It is unclear if the train 
had a passenger list with 
details of those onboard.  
� CAMRAIL should ensure 
there is always a 
passenger manifest for all 
trains.  
� Some passengers simply 
‘disappeared,’ and a few 
dead bodies could not be 
identified.  
� Forensic techniques 
should be used to identify 
missing persons and/or 
body parts after disasters. 
Compensation for 
Victims  
� CAMRAIL and the 
Government decided to 
provide arbitrary 
compensation to the 
victims.  
� The government should 
legislate a robust 
compensation policy and 
process for disasters in 
the country.  
� The compensation 
amount is insufficient and 
does not reflect the 
injuries of victims.  
� The government should 
intervene to protect 
disaster victims if there is 
evidence that they are 
being exploited.  
� Government pledged 
compensation was 
late—official list of 
beneficiaries published 
three years after the 
incident.  
� Financial assistance to 
victims should be swift 
because victims often 
need urgent treatment 
with implications for 
their livelihoods. 
Commission of 
Enquiry (COE)  
� Government ‘s COE was 
under the auspices of the 
PM.  
� An independent COE 
should have been created 
considering the 
government has stakes in 
CAMRAIL. 
Blame Avoidance  � Both CAMRAIL and the 
Government tried to 
avoid blame and divert 
culpability for the ETD  
� Transport stakeholders 
should acknowledge and 
strive to correct mistakes 
rather than engaging in 
blame avoidance 
measures.  
� There were alleged 
attempts both by the 
government and 
CAMRAIL to conceal 
evidence that might 
implicate them in the 
accident.  
� Attempts to conceal vital 
evidence from disaster 
scenes is a criminal 
offence that should be 
investigated, and the 
culprits punished. 
Implications for 
CAMRAIL  
� The Government planned 
to review key aspects of 
its rail transport 
agreement with 
CAMRAIL after the COE 
findings.  
� The actions suggested 
should be speedily 
implemented, enforced 
and monitored on a 
regular basis. Such 
actions should not only be 
taken after deadly train 
crashes.  
� The Government and 
victims sued CAMRAIL to 
get reasonable 
compensation packages 
for victims  
� CAMRAIL should have a 
robust compensation 
policy and reasonable 
budget to compensate its 
customers when such 
incidents occur. 
Source: Authors 
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independent COE should be government policy, enshrined in legislation, 
rather than at the discretion of the government. In fact, those commis-
sioning an inquiry (independent or not), should not be implicated in the 
matter to be investigated, should not be witnesses, should be at arm’s 
length so as to ensure the integrity of the investigation and should not be 
in a position to be put under improper pressure [69]. The COE into the 
ETD did not meet these criteria, hence the blame apportioned to one 
party in the concession is arguably, unjust. Only by commissioning an 
independent enquiry can the parties involve in a concession take full 
responsibility for their actions, resolve disputes and work in an atmo-
sphere of mutual trust, including with the public. 
Attempts to publicly avoid and divert culpability for the accident by 
both the government and CAMRAIL shows a sense of irresponsibility and 
mutual distrust between the partners. This may have implications for 
future cooperation because it might lead to an opaque environment 
where neither party feels comfortable to disclose factual information 
about their respective challenges [4], which is vital for the successful 
operation of a concession railway model. 
The alleged intervention of the Minister of Transport to increase 
passenger traffic prior to the ETD was ill-conceived. Although the 
Ministry of Transport is the political authority responsible for transport 
services, responsibility for passenger operations lies with CAMRAIL [4]. 
The Minister’s intervention could be attributed to mistrust in CAMRAIL, 
inexperience in the railway sector and how to manage passenger over-
flow. The safety issues mentioned in the COE’s report could be attrib-
uted to CAMRAIL’s weak/poor operational service management. 
The comments in the COE’s report that: “the response of the emergency 
services was inadequate and/or poor,” confirmed the findings of this 
research and could be associated to communication and coordination 
resistance factors in Cameroons DM system [70]. The chaotic post ETD 
emergency management that was dominated by ad-hoc decisions reveals 
the challenges inherent in Cameroon’s emergency management opera-
tions. Incident management activities like DVI and casualty tracking are 
yet to be fully addressed in DM policies. 
The government has established an emergency relief fund [71], yet it 
took almost a year for the potential beneficiaries of the ETD to be 
identified [44] and recently, on August 2, 2019, the PM’s office pub-
lished the final official list of beneficiaries, three years after the ETD 
[72]. Delay in providing financial assistance to victims makes the service 
not fit for purpose and ineffective since most victims are rendered 
destitute while waiting for too long. Similarly, CAMRAIL provided an 
arbitrary compensation because there is no enforceable government 
legislative provision for victims of accidents. Considering the needs of 
victims, vulnerability to technological hazards should not play second 
fiddle in DRR policies, plans and resilience strategies. The decision to 
sack and replace CAMRAIL’s top management following the ETD could 
be attributed to operational incompetence and misappropriation of 
funds. 
The ETD demonstrates the perils on Cameroon’s railways, which is 
laggards and atrophied and can be attributed to resistance factors in 
Cameroon’s DRR framework including weak legislative structures/ca-
pacities [8]. The lack of adequate resources for DRR [70] entails a 
reactive crisis management model compromising safety and leading to 
technological hazards. Indeed, DRR should be incorporated in the daily 
decision making of organisations, companies, civil society and govern-
ments to achieve sustainable development [15]. Though a signatory to 
the SFDRR, there is little evidence of progress in Cameroon’s DRR 
initiatives. 
The challenges in Cameroon’s railway sector could have conse-
quences for road transportation. The unsafe railway network, we would 
argue, is contributing to the deteriorating road condition because of the 
increasing migration from rail to road-unfriendly traffic by big trucks 
carrying heavy goods and sustaining heavy traffic. A good railway 
management service will not only reduce rail inefficiencies, fatalities 
and cost, but also have a positive effect on road transport. 
The response of the government to the ETD demonstrates that the 
political agendas in the railway sector seem to be dominated by short- 
term urgencies, rather than a comprehensive and strategic overhaul of 
the sector. If the decisions taken by the government and CAMRAIL 
following the ETD are implemented, rail operations can improve in the 
short-term. Nevertheless, a robust regulatory and institutional frame-
work for risk reduction, particularly a tightly regulated railway trans-
portation sector would be necessary to mitigate contemporary and 
emerging risks/mishaps in the long-term. That would also save scarce 
resources spent on poorly executed response and recovery operations. 
Train crashes have persisted in Cameroon because the stakeholders have 
failed to fully exploit railway’s modern technologies, making safety 
unsustainable and elusive. 
For CAMRAIL to keep a solid reputation, as well as maintain reli-
ability standards and safe-guard human life, the regulatory/institutional 
framework, infrastructure improvement, better maintenance and oper-
ational tactics should be improved. 
This research is just the tip of an iceberg considering the numerous 
train crashes that occur in Cameroon and the existence of several 
resistance factors in Cameroons’ disaster management system that post 
challenges for effective DRR and response [70]. As mentioned earlier, 
the EM-DAT/CRED database does not show an accurate picture of 
technological hazards (including train crashes) in Cameroon. In fact, a 
high frequency of train crashes occur every year with potentially dire 
ramifications for the victims but are rarely captured in academic 
research. Hopefully, this article will rejuvenate research interest in 
technological, social and intentional hazards/disasters in Cameroon and 
Africa. 
8. Conclusion and recommendations 
This article has analysed the management of the ETD that occurred 
on October 21, 2016 in Cameroon, considered the worst ever in the 
country. Although Cameroon’s DM system is accustomed to responding 
to disasters and/or major incidents, the research findings have unveiled 
gaps in the response and recovery operations following the ETD. Find-
ings indicate that CAMRAIL could not cognitively assess and review its 
operations when inundated with passengers due to road transport 
disruption. The management made poor operational decisions that 
eventually caused the ETD although remote causes associated with 
safety practices are also to be blamed. 
The response to the ETD was unsatisfactory. Limitations have been 
identified in standard response activities such as crisis incident man-
agement, search and rescue, emergency treatment, evacuation of the 
sick/death, DVI and casualty tracking. Indeed, emergency training and 
conducting emergency drills is extremely limited or absent. We would 
argue that a well-resourced and trained emergency services with regular 
incident response drills is vital to improve response to technological 
hazards and disasters in Cameroons. 
The study is also wary of the recovery practices, particularly con-
cerning compensation for victims, which is not only inadequate, but 
delayed. In a country where life and/or property insurance is very 
limited, appropriate DM policies on compensation for disaster victims is 
invaluable to enhance and facilitate disaster recovery. More detailed 
recommendations on improving the response and recovery to the ETD 
and consequently technological disasters in Cameroon with implications 
for other developing countries are provided in Table 2. The recom-
mendations show that improvements are needed in the response oper-
ations like search and rescue, provision of medical assistance, 
evacuation, mass casualty handling, DVI and general incident 
management. 
This research has shown that railway service in Cameroon seems not 
to fit expectations. While the challenges involving the management of 
train accidents in Cameroon has yet to be quantified, the need for in- 
depth investigation into the matter is required in order to provide 
realistic and pragmatic solutions. Therefore, further research to under-
stand how disaster risk reduction and response can mitigate railway 
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accidents and enhance customer confidence in Cameroon’s railway 
transportation sector is needed. 
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